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Keynote Article 
 
Future War, Future Law  
 
Eric Talbot Jensen 
 
ABSTRACT 
Advancing technology will dramatically affect the weapons 
and tactics of future armed conflict, including the “places” 
where conflicts are fought, the “actors” by whom they are fought, 
and the “means and methods” by which they are fought. These 
changes will stress even the fundamental principles of the law of 
armed conflict, or LOAC. While it is likely that the 
contemporary LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority of 
future conflicts, the international community must be willing to 
evolve the LOAC in an effort to ensure these future weapons and 
tactics remain under control of the law. 
Though many of these advancing technologies are still in 
the early stages of development and design, the time to act is 
now. In anticipation of these developments, the international 
community needs to recognize the gaps in the current LOAC and 
seek solutions in advance of the situation. As the LOAC evolves 
to face anticipated future threats, it will help ensure that 
advancing technologies comply with the foundational principles 
of the LOAC and future armed conflicts remain constrained by 
law. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law for inviting me to this 
 
             Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. The author 
wishes to express gratitude to the staff of the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law for having the foresight to organize a symposium on such 
an important issue and for editorial assistance on the article. The author also 
expresses gratitude to Allison Arnold and Aaron Worthen for invaluable 
research assistance. A video recording of this speech can be found on the 
Minnesota Journal of International Law’s website, 
http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913. 
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symposium, and really, for having this symposium. This is a 
very important subject and one which, if we do not engage on 
now, we will miss an opportunity to really have an impact on 
the future of the law of armed conflict. 
In a recent address, Harold Koh, the State Department 
Legal Advisor, said “Increasingly, we find ourselves addressing 
twenty-first-century challenges with twentieth-century laws.”1 
Mr. Koh is not the only person to espouse this belief.2 The 
twenty-first century challenges that Mr. Koh is referring to 
involve rapidly advancing technologies and changing tactics 
that are beginning to seriously challenge even the foundational 
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, or LOAC.3 I would like 
to spend the next few minutes discussing what I think are some 
waning factors in future armed conflicts and the resulting 
waning legal norms and then attempt a brief peek into the 
future factors that will emerge from advancing technologies 
and even posit some suggestions concerning emerging legal 
norms. 
I do this with some trepidation. As Louise Doswald-Beck 
stated, “Any attempt to look into the future is fraught with 
difficulty and the likelihood that much of it will be wrong.”4 
However, I believe that we are currently at a point when we 
can see into the future of armed conflict and project, at least to 
some degree, the effect of advancing technologies on armed 
conflict and the governing LOAC. It is likely that the 
 
 1. Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: 
Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1772 (2012). 
 2. See Rosa Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 745 
(2004); P.W. Singer, Address at the United States Naval Academy William C. 
Stutt Ethics Lecture: Ethical Implications of Military Robotics (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/usna_singer_robot_ethics.pdf.  
 3. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1772. 
 4. Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian 
Law in Future Wars, in 71 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 39, 39 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998); see also 
Stephen Peter Rosen, The Future of War and the American Military, HARV. 
MAG., May–June 2002, at 29 (“The people who run the American military have 
to be futurists, whether they want to be or not. The process of developing and 
building new weapons takes decades, as does the process of recruiting and 
training new military officers. As a result, when taking such steps, leaders are 
making statements, implicitly or explicitly, about what they think will be 
useful many years in the future.”). Despite the difficulty, it is a vital 
requirement of militaries and one in which plenty of people are still willing to 
engage. See Frank Jacobs & Parag Khanna, The New World, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/09/23/opinion/sunday/the-
new-world.html.   
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contemporary LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority 
of future conflicts, but we must be willing and able to evolve the 
LOAC in an effort to ensure these future weapons and tactics 
remain under control of the law. 
Our current situation is not unlike those who met at the 
Lateran Council of 1139.5 Tradition has it that at the council, 
one of the issues raised was the new invention of the crossbow.6 
The crossbow caused alarm for several reasons. First, it 
allowed killing at a distance, which was not the traditional way 
of combat.7 Secondly, it allowed a peasant who was properly 
trained to kill a knight.8 This combination meant that a 
peasant, who was traditionally of little value as a fighter, could 
now kill a knight, an asset of great value and a major 
investment in training and equipment.9 
Consequently, the Council outlawed the use of the 
crossbow, at least when Christians were fighting each other.10 
Of course, that legal prohibition hardly survived the vote that 
was taken to sustain it.11 The important point this example 
makes is that as we contemplate future technologies and their 
linkage with the law, we have to take a practical view. We 
cannot assume that we can merely pronounce a developing 
weapon or tactic as illegal and expect universal compliance.12 
That is not the lesson history teaches us.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. See generally Harold E. Harris, Modern Weapons and the Law of Land 
Warfare, 12 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 7, 9 (1973). 
 6. Martin van Creveld, The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War, 
J. CONTEMP. HIST. 403, 416 (1991). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. (“The story of the early firearms which, by enabling a 
commoner to kill a knight from afar, threatened the continued existence of the 
medieval world, is well known.”). 
 10. Harris, supra note 5, at 9; Donna Marie Verchio, Just Say No? The 
SIrUS Project: Well-Intentioned, But Unnecessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F. L. 
REV. 183, 187 (2001).  
 11. See W.T. Mallison, Jr., The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 308, 316 (1967) (discussing the continued use of the crossbow after the 
ban).  
 12. Id. 
 13. Vericho, supra note 10, at 187 (“The situation at that point in history 
is the same we observe today-no weapon has been effectively restricted or 
eliminated by international regulation.”). 
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For convenience of my analysis, I will focus on the “places” 
where conflicts are fought, the “actors” by whom they are 
fought, and the “means and methods” by which they are fought. 
I remind you that predicting the future is not a promising line 
of work, and I do this hesitantly. My guess is that many of you 
will take issue with my characterization of what the future 
holds. However, I hope that even if you disagree with me, you 
will see the value of having the discussion and engaging on the 
issue of evolving the law of war in order to maintain its 
relevance in your version of the future. 
Lest I be misunderstood, I am certainly not saying that 
these principles of law are no longer binding or useful in any 
situations throughout the world. Undoubtedly, advancing 
technologies which test these laws will emerge gradually and 
unequally among the international community. The majority of 
the current LOAC will continue to apply to most armed 
conflicts for the foreseeable future, but as technologies continue 
to advance, particularly among the advanced nations of the 
world, the LOAC will need to evolve to keep pace with 
innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JENSEN Article 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:03 AM 
286 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol 22 
 
I. PLACES 
 
 
Throughout history, armed conflict has taken place in 
“breathable air” zones—the land, the surface of the ocean, and 
recently the air above the land.14 As the LOAC developed, these 
breathable air zones were concurrently being divided into areas 
of sovereign control,15 with the exception of the high seas and 
the commons, such as the poles.16 The effect of this was that 
the LOAC developed around rules governing sovereign territory 
and was based on presumptions about where armed conflict 
would occur.17 These presumptions are now losing their 
applicability, requiring the international community to 
 
 14. See David Alexander, Pentagon to Treat Cyberspace as "Operational 
Domain", REUTERS, July 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/14/us-usa-defense-cybersecurity-
idUSTRE76D5FA20110714 (identifying the “air, land and sea” as traditional 
areas of operational domain for the military).   
 15. Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 707–09 (2012). 
 16. See generally Ron Purver, Security and Arms Control at the Poles 39 
INT’L J.888, 888–92 (1984) (discussing historical examples of the use of the 
poles for military purposes and noting that military operations in the poles 
were eventually banned for all countries in the first article of the Antarctic 
Treaty).   
 17. See Singer, supra note 2 at 14–16 (noting that “going to war” has 
meant the same thing for 5,000 years and the changing nature of law raises 
legal questions never before considered).   
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reconsider the validity of many LOAC provisions.18  
 
A. WANING FACTORS 
 
I will not discuss each of my proposed waning factors, but 
several deserve specific mention. As I mentioned a moment ago, 
one of the most important waning factors in future conflict is 
the limitation to breathable air zones.19 As I will discuss later 
concerning “actors,” the limitation of operating in breathable 
air zones is swiftly disappearing.20 Miniaturization and robotics 
are opening areas to use that have previously not been 
available.21 We will soon not think of the ability to breath as a 
limitation on our ability to operate. As technology increases, 
military planners will not feel constrained by human 
restrictions, but will find other tools that can function equally 
 
 18. Id. at 16 (suggesting one reason the LOAC needs to be reconsidered is 
that modern enemies know the laws and are using them to their advantage).   
 19. Alexander, supra note 14.  
 20. Id. (discussing the increased need for protection from cyber-attacks 
and suggesting the United States has suffered $1 trillion in economic losses as 
a result of past cyber-attacks).  
 21. Jon Cartwright, Rise of the Robots and the Future of War, THE 
OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/nov/21/military-robots-
autonomous-machines (discussing the increasing role of robots in warfare and 
how technological developments will likely change warfare).  
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well in these areas that lack breathable oxygen.22 
Just as advancing technologies have opened access to new 
areas, existing geographic boundaries are beginning to feel 
pressure from scientific innovation. Armed conflict has for 
centuries been based on the Westphalian style demarcation of 
boundaries.23 Crossing the boundary with your army was a sign 
that armed conflict had begun.24 People on one side of the 
boundary generally associated themselves with one group of 
fighters and people on the other side with the other group.25 
This perspective on geographic boundaries is diminishing.26 
Individuals do not necessarily limit themselves or their 
emotional or patriotic attachments by the geographic 
boundaries which surround them.27 Other means of association, 
such as global social networking, are lessening the perceived 
binding nature of geographic affiliations.28  
Speaking of Westphalia, the system of state supremacy 
instituted by the post-Westphalian peace is quickly eroding.29 
States find their sovereignty threatened both politically and 
 
 22. Nick Hopkins, Militarisation of Cyberspace: How the Global Power 
Struggle Moved Online, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/16/militarisation-of-
cyberspace-power-struggle (discussing an assertion made by the head of the 
US Military, General Martin Dempsey, that the United States needed to fully 
include space and cyberspace operations along with its traditional air-land-sea 
operations).  
 23. See generally PHILIP C. BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, 
PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 75–143, 501–538 (2002) (detailing 
historical armed conflicts and describing how boundaries factored into the 
conflicts).  
 24. See Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the 
Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 CORN. L. REV. 45, 67–77 (November 
2007). 
 25. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1772 (suggesting the traditional actors in 
wars were blocs of countries, but the actors in future conflicts will likely be 
“networks of actors connected in countless tangible and intangible ways”).  
 26. Id.; Frederic Megret, War and the Vanishing Battlefield, 9 LOY. U. 
CHI. INT’L L. REV. 131, 131–33 (2011) (discussing the classic notion of a 
battlefield and its diminishing relevance in modern conflicts).   
 27. See Singer, supra note 2, at 11 (discussing a fundraiser held by college 
students at Swarthmore to take a stand against genocide in Darfur in which 
the proceeds were used to enter negotiations to rent drones to deploy to 
Sudan).  
 28. See Koh, supra note 1, at 1771–72 (“[W]e live in an age not divided by 
a Berlin Wall but linked by a World Wide Web.”).  
 29. See generally Bobbitt, supra note 7, at 283–342, 667–807 (discussing 
how the development of the market-state and increasing number of global 
problems such as AIDS, environmental issues, and the changing landscape of 
war are eroding traditional notions of state sovereignty). 
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territorially by a number of emerging forces, supra- and 
supernational in nature.30 It used to be that States were the 
final speaker on issues considered incident to sovereignty, such 
as the internal and external use of force, domestic policing, 
treatment of citizens, and relations with peers.31 State-
centricity as the sole way of viewing the world is waning and 
being overtaken by other views that have much more traction 
today.32 I am not arguing that the state system is going away, 
but that its exclusivity—and possibly its supremacy in relation 
to certain previously sovereign prerogatives—is evaporating. 
Finally, just a word about consent; much has been said 
lately about consent as the basis for extraterritorial military 
actions. The United States continues to rely—at least in part—
on consent for its prosecution of the war on terror in countries 
such as Yemen and Pakistan.33 The question remains 
unanswered as to whether, if that consent were removed, the 
United States would cease military operations it could justify 
under a self-defense argument.34 I believe that the U.S. is 
setting a precedent that will inevitably weaken the doctrine of 
consent and, coupled with the weakening of geographic borders, 
allow future military actions under various self-defense 
theories that will dramatically weaken the need for consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its 
Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 7–8 (1998). 
 32. Id. (discussing the abundance of scholarship produced by economists, 
businessmen, political scientists, and journalists that suggests the state-
centric model is on the decline).  
 33. Greg Miller, Yemen’s Leader Says He Approves All Drone Strikes, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2012, at A3; Adam Entous, Siobhan Gorman & Evan 
Perez, U.S. Unease Over Drone Strikes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904441004045776415208580114
52.html.  
 34. Entous, Gorman & Perez, supra note 33 (noting the United States 
believes it has broad authority to defend itself against those who planned the 
attacks of September 11, 2001).  
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B. WANING LAW 
 
The waning of these (and other) factors will impact the law 
and particularly the LOAC. As geographic boundaries lose 
meaning and the primacy of states wanes, a number of 
particular LOAC principles will face increasing attack.  
The bifurcation of the LOAC between international armed 
conflicts, or IACs, and non-international armed conflicts, or 
NIACs, is already under fire.35 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross, or ICRC,36 as well as international tribunals37 
 
 35. Jensen, supra note 15, at 702–706.  
 36. See Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC President, Address at the Sixtieth 
Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: Sixty Years of the Geneva 
Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future (Aug. 12, 
2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-
conventions-statement-president-120809.htm; Jakob Kellenberger, ICRC 
President, Address at the Follow-Up Meeting to the Sixtieth Anniversary of 
the Geneva Conventions: Strengthening Legal Protection for Victims of Armed 
Conflicts (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ 
statement/ihl-development-statement-210910.htm. 
 37. In addition to the quote beginning Section V, the Tadić Appellate 
Court also argued that “[i]f international law, while of course duly 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the 
protection of human beings, it is only natural that the [bifurcation between 
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and renowned scholars38 have all argued that the LOAC 
bifurcation has lost its usefulness. In a powerful quote by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the Court stated “What is inhumane, and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and 
inadmissible in civil strife.”39 The division of the binding nature 
of LOAC principles, those that apply to NIACs and those that 
apply to IACs, is quickly becoming obsolete.40 
Little needs to be said about the declaration of war, a now 
antiquated idea.41 As Robert Turner has written, “Although 
conflicts between and among states continue, no state has 
issued a formal declaration of war [since the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War].”42 Similarly, the idea that conflicts terminate with a 
formal agreement on cessation of hostilities also lacks 
currency.43 It is hard to imagine the United States signing a 
peace accord with the various iterations of al-Qaeda to signify 
the formal end to that conflict.44 
 
IAC and NIAC] should gradually lose its weight.” Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. 
IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 38. See Emily Crawford, Unequal Before the Law: The Case for the 
Elimination of the Distinction between International and Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 441, 483–84 (2007); Avril McDonald, 
The Year in Review, 2 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 113, 121 (1998) (“With the 
increase in the number of internal and internationalised armed conflicts is 
coming greater recognition that a strict division of conflicts into internal and 
international is scarcely possible, if it ever was.”); see also Michael Reisman, 
Remarks at a Panel on the Application of Humanitarian Law in 
Noninternational Armed Conflicts (Apr. 18, 1991), in 85 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 83, 85 (suggesting a bifurcated system serves as “a sweeping exclusion 
device that permits the bulk of armed conflict to evade full international 
regulation”); Michael N. Schmitt, Yoram Dinstein & Charles H.B. Garraway, 
The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: With 
Commentary, INT’L INST. HUMANITARIAN L. (2006), 
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20
of%20NIAC.pdf (suggesting that laws addressing the growing problems 
created by NIACs need to be developed).   
 39. Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 119 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 40. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 41. ROBERT F. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (1983). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Brooks, supra note 2, at 725–729 (noting the erosion of temporal 
restrictions on some international conflicts). 
 44. Id. at 726 (suggesting a peace accord between the United States and 
al-Qaeda is unlikely for several reasons, including the nature of the “war on 
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While technically not a part of the LOAC, the distinction 
between the applicability of the jus ad bellum, or the law of 
going to war, and the jus in bello, or the LOAC, is also on the 
wane.45 Current technologies such as cyber warfare have led 
many to discuss the difficulty of determining when states are 
actually in armed conflict.46 Future technologies will make that 
an even more difficult distinction to make as the idea of 
crossing a border to signal hostilities becomes increasingly 
anachronistic.47 
Finally for this section, the law of neutrality will also 
become less and less applicable as geographic boundaries 
become more porous and states struggle to maintain the 
monopoly of violence. The soon-to-be-published “Tallinn 
Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare,”48 in which I participated, struggled to apply the 
doctrines of neutrality to cyber warfare and acknowledged that 
the current rules need to evolve to deal effectively with future 
technologies.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
terrorism” and fact that al-Qaeda is not a state and as such may not be able to 
enter a formal peace agreement). 
 45. Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and 
Jus in Bello in Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 541, 541–
42 (2009).  
 46. Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-
Defense, in 87 INT’L L. STUD. 59, 71–72 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. 
Wollschlager eds., 2011).  
 47. See id.; Megret, supra note 26, at 132 (noting that the notion of the 
traditional “battlefield” is disappearing).  
 48. THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 214 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.) (forthcoming March 2013). 
 49. Id. at 212, see generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Sovereignty and 
Neutrality in Cyber Conflict, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 815, 838–841 (2012).  
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C. EMERGING FACTORS 
 
The lack of limitation to breathable air zones will move 
armed conflict to areas where it is currently not occurring.50 
Future armed conflicts will occur without respect to national 
borders, on the seabed, under the ground, and in space.51 It will 
also occur across the newly recognized domain of cyberspace.52 
And it will occur in all of these places simultaneously. 
The United States has already demonstrated in its “Global 
War on Terror” that the LOAC is not well prepared to regulate 
an armed conflict against a transnational non-state terrorist 
actor who does not associate itself with geographic boundaries. 
53 The waning geographic affiliation and increasing global 
social affiliation which will be discussed more later will create 
transnational linkages between previously unconnected people 
 
 50. See Hopkins, supra note 22.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Alexander, supra note 14. 
 53. Megret, supra note 26, at 132 (arguing that the “death of the 
battlefield significantly complicates the waging of war and may well herald 
the end of the laws of war as a way to regulate violence).  
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will make identifying the battlefield extremely difficult. 
Mackubin Owens has written that “multidimensional war in 
the future is likely to be characterized by distributed, weakly 
connected battlefields.”54 
Few of these areas have seen armed conflict to this point.55 
And perhaps that will continue. However, as technology 
advances and these areas become available for weaponization, 
or at least for the placement of sensors, the temptation to 
militarize these areas will be irresistible.56 
 
D. EMERGING LAW  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many of these individual domains just discussed are 
regulated by a treaty regime. For example, the Outer Space 
Treaty discourages military activities in space.57 There is also a 
treaty which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons on the ocean 
floor or seabed.58 These international agreements will become 
 
 54. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Reflections on Future War, 61 NAVAL WAR 
C. REV. 61, 71 (2008). 
 55. See Hopkins, supra note 22 (suggesting more sophisticated tools of 
cyber-warfare exist but have rarely been used).   
 56. Id. (suggesting the potential to conduct future military operations in 
space and cyberspace).  
 57. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies arts. 3-4, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 201. 
 58. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons 
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and 
in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115. 
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more and more difficult to apply and to comply with.59  
Even if states continue to regard these rules as binding in 
the face of the transformation of geographic boundaries, these 
agreements still serve only to bind states.60 The continuing 
diversification of actors in armed conflict will force states to 
consider whether they should remain militarily outside of these 
areas while non-state actors begin to operate within;61 states 
will reconsider their legal obligations and take actions to 
establish control in these currently unmilitarized areas.62 Laws 
might form to authorize states to exclude non-state actors from 
operating in these areas.63 A new regime established around 
the global commons, ensuring state access but allowing states 
to enforce exclusion to non-state actors, could develop.64 
Many possibilities exist for resolution here, but the new 
legal answer will revolve around actors, rather than geographic 
boundaries. The commons will be accessible by certain actors, 
rather than open to all. 
This focus on actors and their impact on the places where 
armed conflict will occur in the future provides an excellent 
transition to the next area of emphasis—actors in future armed 
conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 4 (“In the light of such developments, 
States cannot continue to simply assume that the present scope of application 
of humanitarian law treaties suffices.”). 
 60. See id. (“Recent attempts by the government of Colombia to indicate 
clearly that the new treaty banning antipersonnel mines applies to non-State 
entities ran into difficulties when certain Western governments could not 
accept the proposition that such entities might have responsibilities under 
international law.”). 
 61. Mégret, supra note 26, at 145, 148-151. 
 62. See id. at 149, 151 (“However, it is not only ‘transnational terrorists’ 
who fundamentally change the nature of the battlefield, but also the states 
that chose to follow them on that terrain, effectively fighting ‘a war’ as if it 
unfolded on a ‘global battlefield.’. . . [H]umanitarians have been tempted to 
extend the scope of the battlefield to make sure that as much violence as 
possible falls under its constraints.”). 
 63. See Wolff Heintchel von Heinegg, Current Legal Issues in Martime 
Operations, 80 INT’L L. STUD. 207, 216 for precedent on exclusion zones in the 
context of, and questionable legality, under traditional LOAC. 
 64. See id. 
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II. ACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols 
categorize everyone in armed conflict as either combatants or 
civilians.65 The United States continues to assert that there is a 
small category of individuals who exist in the twilight between 
these two categories, most recently known as “unprivileged 
belligerents.”66 Within the category of civilians are individuals 
who forfeit their protections by taking a “direct part in 
hostilities.”67 As the post 9-11 “War on Terror” has progressed, 
this category has been understood to include organized armed 
groups68 (e.g. terrorist organizations). There is much we could 
 
 65. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
arts. 3, 4, 6, Aug. 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 66. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Respondents’ 
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to 
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In Re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litigation, NO. 08-0442 (D.D.C., filed March 13, 2009); Prosecuting Terrorists; 
Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 47 (2009) (statement of Michael J. Edney, 
Counsel, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP.). 
 67. Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 51. 
 68. Nils Melzer, Int’l Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1006-09 
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say about these categorizations, but the waters on these issues 
will get deeper and murkier. 
 
A. WANING FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned previously, the LOAC was formulated 
largely based on a Westphalian model of state sovereignty.69 
Principles such as reciprocity70 and the state’s monopolization 
of force71 were foundational principles which undergird the 
LOAC, especially the provisions applying to actors on the 
battlefield. However, the notion of a battlefield populated by 
only organized state militaries who comply with all aspects of 
the LOAC is not what future battlefields will be like, if they 
ever were like that.72 Modern battlefields are fluid and ill-
defined spaces where the actors are seldom clearly identified73 
 
(2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review 
/review-872-p991.htm. 
 69. See generally BOBBITT, supra note 23, at 75–143, 501–538. 
 70. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 4, at 41 (“[R]eciprocity did become 
important with the introduction of new rules in treaties, namely, the 
international law rule that parties need to be bound by the treaties in 
question.”). 
 71. Jensen, supra note 15, at 708, 715. 
 72. Kellenberger, supra note 36. 
 73. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author.). 
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and often not even present at the place of attack.74  
The vast majority of the armed conflicts in recent decades 
have not been between states, but between states and non-state 
actors or between two groups of non-state actors.75 Advancing 
technologies will make this phenomena even more 
pronounced.76 The ability of non-state actors to exert state-level 
violence combined with the diminishing association of 
individuals and groups to states will result in the waning of 
many factors currently prevalent in armed conflict.77 
A result of the decreasing number of armed conflicts 
between states is that fewer and fewer conflicts occur between 
“combatants” and more and more involve some form of 
“fighters,” whether those be organized armed groups, narco-
terrorists, or individuals who are directly participating in 
hostilities.78 The changing nature of participants in armed 
conflict should cause a reassessment of the applicability of the 
current LOAC paradigm. This process has already begun with 
the ICRC’s issuance of the Interpretive Guidance on Direct 
Participation in Hostilities.79 This tacit acceptance that the 
current understanding that the LOAC needs updated is a 
harbinger of things to come. Future armed conflict will 
undoubtedly increase the difficulty of defining actors on the 
battlefield.80 The differentiation between fighters and non-
fighters will become even more blurred as global technologies 
allow linkages and associations among people not contemplated 
in 1949 or 1977.81 
In addition to the categorization of participants in armed 
 
 74. Megert, supra note 26, at 154 (“[T]his will cover crimes committed 
outside actual battle zones but that nonetheless display a strong element of 
connection to them.”). 
 75. Themnér, Lotta Themnér & Peter Wallensteen, 2012. Armed Conflicts 
by Type, 1946-2011, 49(4) JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 565, 566, 568 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/122/122552_conflict_type_2011.pdf. 
 76. See Watts, supra note 46, at 61 (“Second, and related, CNA will 
produce a significantly expanded cast of players, creating a complex and 
uncontrollable multipolar environment comprising far more States and non-
State actors pursuing far more disparate interests than in previous security 
settings. CNA are unprecedented conflict levelers.”). 
 77. See id. at 62, 73, 76 (“Either one accepts a real threat to the positive 
jus ad bellum’s claim to law, or one accepts very real threats to States’ security 
as a trade-off for preserving legal idealism.”). 
 78. See Jensen, supra note 15; Crawford, supra note 38, at 442. 
 79. See Melzer, supra note 68.  
 80. See Mégret, supra note 26, at 138; Watts, supra note 46. 
 81. See Mégret, supra note 26, at 138; Brooks, supra note 2, at 677. 
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conflict, the ability to attribute actions in armed conflict to 
specific actors is being significantly undermined through the 
use of advancing technologies. Cyber operations are a good 
example of this difficulty. The difficulty of attributing cyber 
actions has been well documented.82 The ability to hide one’s 
identity or appear to be someone else is more problematic with 
stand-off weapons such as cyber weapons. Future weapons will 
continue to make attribution difficult, forcing the international 
community to reevaluate the approach to attribution. 
 
B. WANING LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The increasing conflation of fighters and civilians will 
devalue the legal distinctions between combatant and civilian 
as categories that determine protections from targeting.83 To 
the extent that the legal classification is useful in current 
armed conflicts, its utility will decrease as asymmetrical 
disadvantages force non-state fighters to seek anonymity while 
taking part in hostilities.84  
The results of this conflation will undermine the current 
regime of status-based targeting and instead require most 
targeting decisions to be based on conduct.85 Recent conflicts in 
 
 82. Collin Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, CHI.–KENT J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. (forthcoming May 2013). 
 83. Brooks supra note 2, at 730-31, 761. 
 84. See Watts, supra note 46, at 72-73. 
 85. See Brooks, supra note 2, at 706, 756-57 (“Thus, for instance, one's 
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Iraq and Afghanistan have already verified this emerging 
trend.86 Status-based targeting will only be applicable to a very 
limited number of circumstances and will force states to look 
for other means of determining targets.87 
The inability to meaningfully differentiate between actors 
on the battlefield will have a detrimental effect on the bedrock 
principle of distinction.88 As states suffer devastating effects 
from non-attributable sources, the pressure for an evolved 
understanding of the principle of distinction will be great. For 
example, protecting a nation’s critical infrastructure from 
computer attack89 may be so important that attribution (and 
even individualized distinction) may become a casualty of the 
need to prevent significant social harm.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
status as a ‘lawful combatant’ under the Geneva Conventions hinges, as a 
threshold matter, not on one's substantive actions but on certain questions of 
form: whether one is under responsible command, whether one wears ‘a fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,’ and whether one carries arms 
openly. . . . Status as a lawful combatant should not hinge on whether a person 
is ‘commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,’ has a ‘fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance’ (e.g, a uniform or other sign by 
which combatants can be visually distinguished from civilians), or whether 
she ‘carr[ies] arms openly.’”). 
 86. Id. passim. 
 87. See Watts, supra note 46 ; Mégret, supra note 26. 
 88. See Mégret, supra note 26.   
 89. See Sean M. Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical 
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 403, 421 (2007). 
 90. See id. 
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C. EMERGING FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the sixty-year commemoration of the Geneva 
Conventions, then-President of the ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger, 
stated that “the potential range of ‘new actors’ whose actions 
have repercussions at the international level is of course vast. 
While many of these ‘new actors’ have in fact been around for 
some time, they have called into question—and will continue to 
call into question—some of the more traditional assumptions 
on which the international legal system is based.”91 
I divide my remarks in this area into two subcategories: 
 
 91. Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Red Cross, Sixty Years of the 
Geneva Conventions and the Decades Ahead at the Conference on the 
Challenges for IHL posed by New Threats, New Actors and New Means and 
Methods of War, ICRC (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-convention-
statement-091109.htm.  
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emerging factors concerning influences on “existing actors” and 
emerging factors concerning “new actors.” I will begin with the 
latter category. 
This Article has already alluded to the break-down of 
geographic boundaries and the resulting traditional 
associations. Modern and future social networking capabilities 
will allow instantaneous linkages between individuals and 
groups from across the globe. These “instantaneous 
transnational communities of interest” mean that, as Jeffrey 
Walker argues, “[i]t’s simply no longer necessary to have a 
state sponsor for an interested group of people to effect changes 
within the international community.”92 Anthony Lake describes 
how these instantaneous transnational communities of interest 
use “technology to forge vast alliances across borders, and . . . a 
whole host of new actors challenging, confronting, and 
sometimes competing with governments on turf that was once 
their exclusive domain.”93 Philip Bobbitt has written, “The 
internet enabled the aggregation of dissatisfied and malevolent 
persons into global networks.”94  
Social networking’s effects on armed conflict have already 
been demonstrated during the Arab Spring.95 The future effects 
of this phenomenon will undoubtedly increase over time. 
Audrey Kurth Cronin draws the analogy between social 
networking and the levée en masse. She argues that it allows 
cyber mobilization of people across the entire globe on issues of 
common ideology.96 The result of this expanding social 
networking linkage is that people will begin to view themselves 
less as Americans or Germans or Iranians and more as 
members of global ideologies created, maintained, and 
mobilized through social media.97 The resulting cultural 
 
 92. Jeffrey K. Walker, Thomas P. Keenan Memorial Lecture: The Demise 
of the Nation-State, the Dawn of New Paradigm Warfare, and a Future 
Profession of Arms, 51 A.F. L. REV. 323, 329330329-30 (2001). 
 93. Walker, supra note 92, at 330 (quoting ANTHONY LAKE, SIX 
NIGHTMARES: REAL THREATS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD AND HOW AMERICA CAN 
MEET THEM 281–82 (2000)). 
 94. Philip C. Bobbitt, Inter Arma Enim Non Silent Leges, View of Law and 
War, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 253, 259 (2012). 
 95. George Griffin, Egypt's Uprising:Tracking the Social Media Factor, 
PBS.ORG (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/middle_east/jan-june11/revsocial_04-
19.html.  
 96. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization: the New Levée en Masse, 36 
PARAMETERS 77 passim (2006). 
 97. See Michigan State University News, Civilian Cyber-Warriors Not 
JENSEN Article 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:03 AM 
2013] FUTURE WAR, FUTURE LAW 303 
 
uncertainty will provide a means and incentive for like-minded 
individuals to connect and interact on areas of agreement that 
are not determined by geographic borders or national 
affiliation. 
These groups will use social networks to recruit, gather 
resources, provide financial support, collect and pass 
intelligence, and create and transmit plans of action including 
attacks. The communications will occur far from where the 
effects of the communications will eventually be felt, but could 
conceivably have significant effects on ongoing armed conflicts. 
A current example of a developing trend is the computer 
activist group known as “Anonymous.”98 In addition to state-
affiliated hacking groups and their documented participation in 
armed conflict,99 hacktivists, who have organized themselves 
around a social theme or ideology, such as the members of 
Anonymous, have also started to take part in armed conflict.100  
While many of the participants are conscious of the 
influence of social networking on armed conflict, advancing 
technology will increase the likelihood that individuals and 
groups will become unwitting “direct participants.” As will be 
discussed later, the use of future technologies such as virology 
and nanotechnology will allow attackers to increase the reach 
of their weapons by using the civilian population to propagate 
their weapons.101 A DNA-coded virus will eventually reach its 
target after harmlessly passing through the population.102 
Cyber attackers will use the same methodology. As with 
 
Driven by Patriotism, MICH. ST. U. RES. (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://research.msu.edu/tags/cyber-warriors.  
 98. Anonymous, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/anonymous
_internet_group/index.html. 
 99. Collin Allan, supra note 82; David E. Hoffman, The New Virology: 
From Stuxnet to Biobombs, The Future of War by Other Means, 185 FOREIGN 
POL’Y 78, 80 (2011), available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_new_virology?print=yes
&hidecomments=yes&page=full. 
 100. Jana Winter & Jeremy A. Kaplan, Communications Blackout Doesn't 
Deter Hackers Targeting Syrian Regime, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/11/30/hackers-declare-war-on-
syria/#ixzz2Ht69GA1J. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman & Steven Kotler, Hacking the 
President’s DNA, ATLANTIC MAG. (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidents-
dna/309147/. 
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STUXNET,103 malware will be fashioned to spread broadly 
through the internet but only cause damage to specific systems 
in a precision targeted attack.104 For this to work, individual 
civilians and their computer systems will be a vital, though 
unwitting, part of the attack. Similarly, hacktivists, such as the 
members of Anonymous, participate along a spectrum of 
activity. Some may be writers of harmful code; others may be 
coordinators of the attack. Still others may simply leave their 
computers on, allowing those running the malware to slave 
their computers and put them to a nefarious use. In this way, 
they may become unwitting participants. However, to the 
individual or state being attacked, there will be almost no 
timely way of ascertaining the difference. Nations will struggle 
to deal with how to classify and then respond to such 
individuals, especially when the groups are extremely large 
and geographically dispersed.105 
In addition to influences on actors, future technologies will 
create wholly new actors that are either a limited part, or not 
part at all, of the current paradigm.106 These new actors will 
nonetheless emerge as important factors in future armed 
conflict. These include those who deal in new types of 
weapons—referred to as “new arms” dealers—global criminal 
enterprises, corporate armies and robots or autonomous 
weapon systems. 
Advancing technology will provide a wide array of new 
weapons, many of which do not require state financing and 
organization to produce or market. In addition to computer 
hacktivists, bio engineers who are creating viruses and other 
DNA-linked tools are springing up around the world.107 There 
is already a very lucrative market for cyber “arms.” It is 
 
 103. See Factbox: What is Stuxnet, REUTERS (Sept.. 24, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/24/us-security-cyber-iran-fb-
idUSTRE68N3PT20100924. 
 104. See Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does Stuxnet 
Demonstrate a Need For Modifications to the Law of Armed Conflict? 35 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 842 passim ((March 2012). 
 105. See Pierre Thomas &and Jack Cloherty, FBI, Facebook Team Up to 
Fight 'Butterfly Botnet', ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/butterfly-botnet-targets-11-million-
including-computer-users/story?id=17947276. 
 106. See Watts, supra note 46. 
 107. Hanno Charisius, Richard Friebe & Sascha, & Karberg, Becoming 
Biohackers: Learning the Game, BBC FUTURE (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130122-how-we-became-biohackers-part-1. 
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sourced almost exclusively by non-state actors.108 A similar 
market for biological and genetic weapons will undoubtedly 
emerge.109 Many of these individuals or groups will see this as 
a business, not as dealing in weapons. Nevertheless, in some 
instances, they will produce, transport, and even sometimes 
unleash these new types of weapons on the targets. 
In addition to these relatively unorganized groups, a 
number of highly organized armed groups will emerge on the 
future battlefield. These include corporate armies, including 
private security companies (PSCs), and global criminal 
enterprises.110 Recent events in Algeria111 are making 
corporations rethink their reliance on state forces for protection 
of multi-billion dollar complexes. Corporate assets will continue 
to exist in unstable areas and even in areas of armed conflict. 
Businesses whose annual revenue exceeds that of the gross 
domestic product of the country in which they have assets are 
unlikely to continue to rely on state forces or police for 
protection if such protection fails. Rather, they will hire private 
security companies or raise their own armies to ensure the 
safety of their personnel and assets. ExxonMobil in Indonesia 
and Talisman Energy in Sudan have already “hired” and/or 
controlled national military forces to protect their business 
interests.112 As armed conflicts ebb and flow, these corporate 
armies will inevitably become involved in armed conflicts, 
stressing the current application of the LOAC.113 Corporate 
 
 108. Michael Riley & Ashlee Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race, 
BUSINESSWEEK (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race-
07212011.html.  
 109. See Charisius, supra note 107; Hessel, supra note 102. 
 110. See generally FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia 
Lehnhardt eds., 2007). 
 111. Aomar Ouali & Paul Schemm, Al-Qaida-linked Militants Seize BP 
Complex in Algeria, Take Hostages Over Mali Intervention, YAHOO! NEWS, 
Jan. 16, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-linked-militants-seize-bp-
complex-algeria-185156149.html.  
 112. Jonathan Horlick et al., American and Canadian Civil Actions 
Alleging Human Rights Violations Abroad by Oil and Gas Companies, 45 
ALTA. L. REV. 653, 657–58 (2008); see also Developments in the Law, 
International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2025, 2029–30 (2001).  
 113. See generally FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET, supra note 110; Eric 
Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: Is it Time for Intermediate Levels of 
Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 214 (2005); Christopher 
J. Mandernach, Warriors Without Law: Embracing a Spectrun of Status for 
Military Actors, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 137 (2007). Christopher J. 
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armies have already been implicated in “unlawful taking of 
property, forced labor, displacement of populations, severe 
damage to the environment, and the manufacture and trading 
of prohibited weapons.”114 This trend will increase in the 
future. 
Another emerging factor is the role played by global 
criminal enterprises. These would include organizations such 
as the narco-traffickers operating in Mexico and other parts of 
Central and South America.115 Reports place the number of 
armed fighters supporting the narco-trafficking in Mexico alone 
at over 100,000.116 This army is substantially larger than the 
armies involved in most recent armed conflicts. 
Global criminal enterprises are also involved in other 
illegal activity, including money laundering, arms smuggling, 
counterfeiting, and the sex trade.117 Criminal enterprises often 
have links to armed conflict because of the goods or services 
that they offer.118 As demand for their goods increases, the 
number of criminal enterprises will only increase. 
We have just heard a truly superb discussion on robotics 
and autonomous weapon systems.119 I will just add a few 
comments of my own. I will revisit these weapons under the 
category of means and methods of warfare, but to the extent 
that robots or other similar weapons systems become 
autonomous, they must also be considered as actors. We have 
 
 114. Regis Bismuth, Mapping a Responsibility of Corporations for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Sailing Between International 
and Domestic Legal Orders, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 203, 204 (2010); see 
also Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Business and International Humanitarian 
Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises 
Under International Humanitarian Law 24 (2006); Erik Mose et al., Corporate 
Criminal Liability and the Rwandan Genocide, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 947, 
973–974 (2008). 
 115. Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The case for a Non-
International Armed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042, 
1066–72 (2011). 
 116. Id. at 1066. 
 117. John Evans, Criminal Networks, Criminal Enterprises, UNIV. B. C., 
INT’L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, at 2, 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/publications/reports/netwks94.pdf (last visited Feb. 
24, 2013).  
 118. Id. 
 119. To review these discussions, please see other Articles in 22 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. (Summer 2013), as well as some articles found in 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 
(forthcoming Winter 2014). To see video recordings of the discussions that took 
place at the 2013 Symposium, please see the Minnesota Journal of 
International Law’s website, http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913. 
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discussed both the Department of Defense’s recently issued 
Directive titled “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,”120 which says 
“autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be 
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,”121 
and the Human Rights Watch report122 calling for a 
multilateral treaty that would “prohibit the development, 
production and use of fully autonomous weapons.”123 My 
personal prognostication is that fully autonomous weapon 
systems will absolutely make their way onto the battlefield and 
eventually become the predominant actors. Having been in 
combat, I believe that controlled and regulated use of 
autonomous weapons systems can provide more reliable 
responses in many cases than relying on human senses and 
decision making. I am firmly convinced it is not a matter of “if,” 
but “when.” 
 
D. EMERGING LAW  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We could spend much more time discussing the emerging 
factors that will affect the actors in future armed conflict, but 
let’s move to a discussion of the emerging law. I will highlight 
two points that I think are important to this discussion: the 
first is the merging of status and conduct by actors, and the 
second is the effects on the principle of discrimination. 
 
 120. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON 
SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012). This Directive followed a DoD Defense Science 
Board Task Force Report issued in July of 2012. DEP’T OF DEF. DEF. SCI. 
BOARD, THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS (July 2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.  
 121. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON 
SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012). 
 122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST 
KILLER ROBOTS (2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf. 
 123. Id. at 5, 46.  
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As alluded to previously, individuals are targeted based on 
either their status as combatants or fighters or on their 
inappropriate conduct as civilians. Emerging technologies and 
tactics will make states want to blur these distinctions. For 
example, the members of “Anonymous” who are preventing the 
military leadership from communicating to subordinates are 
likely taking a direct part in hostilities and are therefore 
targetable. However, if the attack is generated by thousands of 
slaved computers, some owned by witting participants, others 
by unwitting participants, what are the targeting options for 
the target state? Further, is the civilian recreational hacker 
who develops the malware or establishes the botnet targetable? 
In the area of virology, is the designer of the DNA-linked 
virus targetable, even if he or she is just selling it to a 
customer? It is unclear if that individual would be a direct 
participant, especially if he did not know the eventual target of 
the viral attack. What about an organization who sells such 
DNA-linked viruses to the highest bidder? What about the 
completely unwitting carrier of the virus who is about to enter 
the auditorium where the President is about to speak and 
doesn’t know that she is going to infect the President with the 
lethal virus?124 
Transnational social networking communities present 
similar problems. As individuals pass along vital information, 
including attack plans, do they become targetable? Their 
counterparts in a geographically contained kinetic conflict 
would be. Does the fact that these interactions occur thousands 
of miles from the intended event and the originating group 
make a targeting difference? 
Transitioning now to the principle of discrimination, the 
LOAC requires attackers to discriminate in the attack.125 We 
could have a long discussion about what the word “attack” 
means with respect to these new technologies, but I will delay 
that to discuss the impact of new actors on the principle of 
discrimination. Much has already been said about the need for 
human discretion in the attack as it relates to autonomous 
weapon systems. I will add my own thoughts just to say that 
the requirement is that the attack is discriminate, not that a 
human make the decision as to whether to conduct the attack 
 
 124. Hessel, supra note 102.  
 125. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 51, supra note 25, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. 
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or not. 
We are making and using computer malware that is 
making the ultimate decision on discrimination in the attack. 
Stuxnet had been programmed to and was presumably acting 
on its own when it identified the computer controlling the 
centrifuges and then conducted the “attack” on that computer. 
Emerging weapon systems will increasingly be making those 
decisions through automated or natural processes that are 
based on controlled circumstances. To the extent that our 
current interpretation of discrimination is bothered by that, we 
may have to evolve that LOAC understanding. I think it is 
clear that autonomous weapons on the battlefield will increase, 
and the autonomy of those weapon systems will also increase. 
To the extent that we need to adjust the current understanding 
of discrimination in the attack, the LOAC needs to be 
responsive and evolve in order to ensure that these “actors” act 
responsibly.   
 
III. MEANS AND METHODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving now to means and methods of warfare, since the 
development of gunpowder, modern conflicts have been 
characterized by heat, blast, and fragmentation. We have 
recently included some innovative means of conflict including 
numerous non-lethal weapon systems which have proven to be 
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very effective. You will also note that I have cyber operations in 
the category of existing means and methods, though I do not 
believe that states have even begun to tap into the potential 
cyber operations presents.  
 
A. WANING FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that all of these means and methods will 
continue to be a vital part of future armed conflicts, they will 
not maintain the role they currently have. For example, while 
most weapons will still likely use heat, blast, and 
fragmentation as the primary source of injury, the proportion of 
such weapons that are produced and used in any armed conflict 
will steadily decrease. As other weapons that use advanced 
technology enter the arsenal, they will provide more options to 
the commander and will better suit his needs. For example, if a 
commander had access to a DNA-linked virus that would 
effectively kill an enemy leader, he could avoid all the LOAC 
concerns such as proportionality and distinction that would be 
part of a targeting analysis using heat, blast, and 
fragmentation weapons such as a missile. 
Similarly, the idea of an “attack” will wane in the face of 
new weapons. The meaning of attack is defined in API as “acts 
of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in 
defence.”126 This definition is mired in the armed conflict of 
heat, blast, and fragmentation which was characterized by 
violence. However, such a definition is not clear enough to 
adequately address the weapons of the future. Is a cyber-attack 
an act of violence? What about infecting someone with a virus? 
Certainly the victim of the DNA-linked virus is attacked, but 
what about the intermediate carrier who is merely infected but 
 
 126. Id. art. 49, at 25. 
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has no effects? 
The important point this raises is that if infecting a host 
carrier (or a thousand host carriers) with a DNA-linked virus 
that has no physical effects is not an attack, the majority of the 
LOAC principles would not apply to that action and would not 
limit a commander’s ability to conduct such an action. A similar 
analysis applies to cyber actions. Cyber operations that merely 
cause inconvenience are likely not attacks and can therefore 
potentially be targeted at civilians.127 Given the underlying 
purposes of the LOAC, it is unlikely that this understanding of 
“attack” can survive these new weapon systems and will have 
to evolve to provide the protections expected from the LOAC. 
One of the characteristics of heat, blast, and fragmentation 
weapons was a limited dispersal. The military has computer 
programs which model the blast radius of weapons to assist 
commanders in making a correct proportionality analysis. The 
limited dispersion of the weapon system is not an exact science, 
but it is generally discernible. This may not be true of many 
future weapon systems. 
Stuxnet again provides an interesting perspective on this 
topic. Despite its creators’ apparent best attempts, the malware 
made it onto computers that it was not intended to infect.128 
Though it did not have negative effects on those computers,129 
its dispersal was still not tightly controlled. Similar problems 
will occur with other future weapons systems. The inability to 
project the actual dispersal of some future weapons will make 
this a waning principle in the conduct of future armed conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127. See THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO CYBER WARFARE, supra note 18, at 91–95, 133.  
 128. See Holger Stark, Mossad’s Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New 
Era of Cyber War, SPEIGEL ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2011, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-
virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-war-a-778912.html.  
 129. Richmond, supra note 104, at 860–61.  
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B. WANING LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I anticipate that my list of waning law will be quite 
controversial, but remember that I am not necessarily saying 
that these principles will disappear. My argument is that they 
will wane as we currently know them. For example, though it is 
not a LOAC principle, consider for a minute the jus ad bellum 
principle of “use of force” as used in the UN Charter. This is 
applicable here because presumably a use of force would be 
governed by the LOAC. What level of cyber operation equates 
to a “use of force?” There are differing views, though I think the 
predominant view now is the effects test initially set out by 
Michael Schmitt. However, like the previous discussion of 
“attack,” these legal terms need to evolve to maintain their 
currency and ability to regulate future armed conflict. 
Similarly, the LOAC defining principle of “armed conflict” 
will wane as well. The LOAC is not triggered until there is an 
armed conflict. Traditionally, this required some level of 
hostilities.130 In an era of bloodless weapons, as Blake and 
 
 130. See generally Commentary, Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 22–23 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960), 
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Imburgia call them,131 is the trigger of “armed conflict” going to 
be clear enough to regulate conflict? When is a cyber-operation 
“armed?” Or the dispersion of nanobots? Or the spreading of 
GENOMIC altering viruses? 
These weapons will also make us reconsider time-honored 
LOAC principles such as military objective, unnecessary 
suffering, and proportionality. For example, one of the 
potentially unanticipated consequences of Stuxnet is that it has 
the possibility of being reengineered and reused.132 Bernhard 
Langner who first discovered Stuxnet warns that such malware 
can proliferate in unexpected ways: “Stuxnet’s attack code, 
available on the Internet, provides an excellent blueprint and 
jump-start for developing a new generation of cyber warfare 
weapons. . . . Unlike bombs, missiles, and guns, cyber weapons 
can be copied. The proliferation of cyber weapons cannot be 
controlled. Stuxnet-inspired weapons and weapon technology 
will soon be in the hands of rogue nation states, terrorists, 
organized crime, and legions of leisure hackers.”133 
The possibility of reengineering raises an interesting 
question about the proportionality analysis for commanders. 
With heat, blast, and fragmentation weapons, commanders did 
not have to concern themselves with the potential of the 
weapon being reused. However, with cyber malware such as 
Stuxnet, or with a DNA-linked virus, or with a genetic 
mutation, the malware, or virus or mutation remain and can be 
reengineered, reused and resold, potentially leading to 
significant impacts, including death and injury, on civilians 
who were never even implicated in the original attack. Must 
the commander consider this potentiality as he does his 
proportionality analysis prior to using the weapon? I think the 
LOAC does not yet provide a clear answer for that question. To 
the extent that experts have opinions, I have found them to 
differ widely. 
Finally, another waning legal norm is arms control. Arms 
 
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590007?OpenDocument.  
 131. Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”? The Need 
to Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of 
Defining Them as “Weapons”, 66 A.F. L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 132. See Mark Clayton, From the Man Who Discovered Stuxnet, Dire 
Warnings One Year Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0922/From-the-man-who-discovered-
Stuxnet-dire-warnings-one-year-later. 
 133. David E. Hoffman, supra note 42 (quoting Ralph Langer, the German 
industrial control systems security expert who discovered Stuxnet). 
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control has been an effective means of limiting states in the 
production and use of certain weapons, such as chemical134 or 
biological agents,135 as well as nuclear weapons.136 However, 
these international agreements have legally bound states but 
do not reach non-state actors. In an age where many new 
means and methods of warfare are not controlled or 
controllable by states, but can be created in an individual’s 
garage137 or office, arms control agreements lose much of their 
value. Until the international community finds a way to get 
individuals to agree to weapons controls and voluntarily 
comply, arms control agreements will have limited utility for 
many future weapon systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for 
signature Jan. 13, 1993, 3 U.N.T.S. 1974. 
 135. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1982, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/450?OpenDocument. 
 136. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclean Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).  
 137. Wil S. Hylton, How Ready Are We for Bioterrorism? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-
bioterrorism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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C. EMERGING FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III 
recently stated that “few weapons in the history of warfare, 
once created, have gone unused.”138 This quote reinforces the 
point demonstrated by the Lateran Council that once a weapon 
or technology that can be weaponized is developed, it almost 
inevitably ends up on the battlefield. Specific arms control 
regimes have had some success in this area, but the general 
rule is that technology drives weapon development and those 
developed are eventually used in warfare.  
I will start with cyber conflict. While cyber technology is 
not really new, its future uses leave it squarely in the category 
of emerging factors. The potential uses, and dangers, of cyber 
technology are only beginning to be understood. Cyber 
capabilities were viewed by top national security professionals 
and policymakers as the most dangerous of emerging 
capabilities in a recent survey conducted by Foreign Policy.139 
 
 138. John D. Banusiewicz, Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort, FED. 
INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., June 16, 2011. 
 139. See The FP Survey: The Future of War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 
2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/The_Future_of_War?print=ye
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Of course, the general availability of cyber means of armed 
conflict is part of what causes the concern. Many nations, 
including both China and the United States, have 
institutionalized their cyber forces.140 A recent estimate 
suggests that 140 nations already have or are actively building 
cyber capabilities within their military.141 The recent malware 
packages known as Stuxnet, Flame, and Red October aptly 
illustrate that states are already using cyber space to conduct 
military activities that cause harm, similar to kinetic 
operations.142  
Additionally, non-state actors and even individuals have 
access to cyber weapons. Symantec estimates that Stuxnet 
could be created by as few as five to ten highly trained 
computer technicians in as little as six months.143 Non-state 
actors have been known to develop sophisticated malware that 
cause great damage.144  
 
s&hidecomments=yes&page=full (ranking cyberwarfare at a 4.6 on a 1-7 scale, 
1 being the largest threat and 7 being the least threat); Micah Zenko, The 
Future of War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 2011, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_future_of_war. 
(Mar./Apr. 
 140. See Tania Branigan, Chinese Army to Target Cyber War Threat, THE 
GUARDIAN, July 22, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/chinese-army-cyber-war-
department; Andrew Gray, Pentagon Approves Creation of Cyber Command, 
REUTERS, June 23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/24/us-usa-
pentagon-cyber-idUSTRE55M78920090624; Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack 
in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, 
64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 96 (2009).  
 141. Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: 
Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 249 (2010). 
 142. See STUXNET Malware Analysis Paper, CODEPROJECT (Sep. 11, 
2011), http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/246545/Stuxnet-Malware-Analysis-
Paper (explaining Stuxnet was created to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program); 
Full Analysis of Flame’s Command and Control Servers, SECURELIST (Sep. 17, 
2012), http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750/ 
Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command_Control_servers (explaining Flame 
malware, the advanced cyber-espionage tool, was a large scale campaign 
targeting several countries in the Middle East); Red October Computer Virus 
Found, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
news/9800946/Red-October-computer-virus-found.html (explaining Red 
October focused targeting countries in eastern Europe). 
 143. Josh Halliday, STUXNET Worm is the ‘Work of a National 
Government Agency’, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/sep/24/stuxnet-worm-national-
agency. 
 144. See David Kleinbard & Richard Richtmyer, U.S. Catches ‘Love’ Virus: 
Quickly Spreading Virus Disables Multimedia Files, Spawns Copycats, 
CNNMONEY, May 5, 2000, http://money.cnn.com/2000/05/05 
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Moving on to nanotechnology, it is “the understanding and 
control of matter at the nanoscale, at dimensions between 
approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where unique 
phenomena enable novel applications.”145 Nanotechnology has 
already proven its value.146 For example, “a nanoparticle . . . 
has shown 100 percent effectiveness in eradicating the 
hepatitis C virus in laboratory testing.”147  The U.S Government 
Accountability Office reported:  
From fiscal years 2006 to 2010, the National 
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
reported more than a doubling of National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) member 
agencies’ funding for nanotechnology 
environmental, health, and safety (EHS) 
research—from approximately $38 million to 
$90 million. Reported EHS research funding also 
rose as a percentage of total nanotechnology 
funding over the same period, ending at about 5 
percent in 2010.148  
And the United States is not alone. China and Russia are also 
“openly investing significant amounts of money in 
nanotechnology.”149 
As with other innovations, nanotechnology is well on its 
way to being at the forefront of military operations. Between 
 
/technology/loveyou/ (describing how the “I Love You” virus swept through 
banks, securities firms, and Web companies causing damage). 
 145. What it is and How it Works, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INST., 
http://nano.gov/nanotech-101 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013). 
 146. David Brown, Making Steam Without Boiling Water, Thanks to 
Nanoparticles, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2012, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-19/national/35505658_1_steam-
nanoparticles-water (“It shows you could make steam in an artic 
environment.”).  
 147. Dexter Johnson, Nanoparticle Completely Eradicates Hepatitis C 
Virus, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 17, 2012), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/nanoclast/semiconductors/nanotechnology/nanoparticl
e-completely-eradicates-hepatitis-c-
virus?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A
+IeeeSpectrumSemiconductors+%28IEEE+Spectrum%3A+Semiconductors%2
9; see also “Nanorobot” Can be Programmed to Target Different Diseases, 
PHYS.ORG, July 16, 2012, http://phys.org/news/2012-07-nanorobot-
diseases.html (explaining the programmable nature of the nanoparticle makes 
it useful against cancer and other viral infections).  
 148. US Government Accountability Office Releases Report on 
Nanotechnology EHS Research Performance, NANOWERK, June 22, 2012, 
http://www.nanowerk.com/news2/newsid=25691.php. 
 149. See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 131, at 180.  
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2001 and 2006, the Department of Defense spent over $1.2 
Billion on nanotechnology research.150 Blake and Imburgia 
argue that nanotechnology will significantly affect future 
weapons and warfare. They write: 
Scientists believe nanotechnology can be used to 
develop controlled and discriminate biological 
and nerve agents; invisible, intelligence 
gathering devices that can be used for covert 
activities almost anywhere in the world; and 
artificial viruses that can enter into the human 
body without the individual’s knowledge. So 
called ‘nanoweapons’ have the potential to create 
more intense laser technologies as well as self-
guiding bullets that can direct themselves to a 
target based on artificial intelligence. Some 
experts also believe nanotechnology possesses 
the potential to attack buildings as a ‘swarm of 
nanoscale robots programmed only to disrupt 
the electrical and chemical systems in a 
building,’ thus avoiding the collateral damage a 
kinetic strike on that same building would 
cause.151 
Nanotechnology will also eventually produce more 
powerful and efficient bombs, and result in miniature nuclear 
weapons.152 It will lead to the creation of microscopic nanobots 
that can act as sensors to gather information or as weapons to 
attack humans.153 The results of nanotechnology will be 
 
 150. Josh Wolfe & Dan van den Bergh, Nanotech Takes on Homeland 
Terror, FORBES.COM, Aug. 14, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/11/nanotech-terror-cepheid-homeland-
in_jw_0811soapbox_inl.html.  
 151. See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 131, at 180.  
 152. Military Uses of Nanotechnology: The Future of War, 
THENANOAGE.COM, http://www.thenanoage.com/military.htm (last visited Feb. 
7, 2013).7, 2013). 
 153. Scientists and the University of California, Berkeley, are already 
working on the Micromechanical Flying Insect Project; see Micromechanical 
Flying Insect, U.C. BERKELEY, 
http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ronf/mfi.html/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2013) (describing the goal of micromechanical flying insect project is to develop 
a 25 mm device capable of sustained autonomous flight); Nanotech Weaponry, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE NANOTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 12, 2004), 
http://www.crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/02/nanotech_weapon.html 
(explaining molecular manufacturing could lead to a weapon capable of 
seeking and injecting toxin into unprotected humans); Caroline Perry, Mass-
Production Sends Robot Insects Flying, LIVE SCI., Apr. 18, 2012, 
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weapons that are smaller, more mobile, and more potent; 
sensors that are quicker and more accurate, and platforms with 
greater range, effect, and lethality. 
In addition to the means of warfare I have discussed, let 
me also discuss a method of attack—the method of latent 
attack. A latent attack is when a weapon of some kind is placed 
in position, but will not be triggered until sometime in the 
future. The attack may be triggered by a signal sent by the 
weapon’s creator or even by the victim’s own actions. Though 
possible with viruses and nanotechnology delivery systems, the 
classic latent attack is done via computer malware.154 The 
application of this form of emerging warfare as it relates to 
sales of weapons or military equipment is significant. 
To illustrate, assume the United State sells F-16 aircraft to 
other countries, some of which the United States is not sure 
will remain allies. As a precautionary measure, the aircraft 
engineers embed some code in the targeting system that 
prevents that aircraft from targeting United States aircrafts. 
Such a valuable capability and tactic raises interesting legal 
issues which I will discuss next. 
 
D. EMERGING LAW  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging technology will require emerging law. There are 
 
http://www.livescience.com/19773-mini-robot-production-nsf-ria.html (stating 
a new technology will soon allow clones of robotic insects to be mass produced).  
 154. The Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, responsible for 
maintaining America’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, discovered its computer 
systems contained Chinese-made network switches which are used to manage 
data traffic on computer networks. See Steve Stecklow, U.S. Nuclear Lab 
Removes Chinese Tech Over Security Fears, REUTERS, Jan. 7, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-huawei-alamos-
idUSBRE90608B20130107.  
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two particular areas of emerging law that I will discuss and 
both need to evolve in order to keep pace with advancing 
technologies. The first emerging area of law is the principles of 
distinction and discrimination.  
Article 48 of API states the foundational LOAC principle of 
distinction: belligerents may “direct their operations 
only against military objectives.”155 API Article 51, paragraph 2 
reinforces that norm: “The civilian population as such, as well 
as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”156 In 
contrast, the principle of discrimination, or the prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks, comes from API Article 51.4, and 
prohibits attacks which are “not directed at a specific military 
object” and “those which employ a method or means of combat 
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective” or 
“which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.”157 The principle of discrimination is considered “an 
implementation of the principle of distinction.”158  
Future weapons present options that are difficult to 
analyze under the existing law. For example, assume that the 
United States wants to kill a foreign enemy leader and chooses 
to do so by way of a DNA-linked virus. In order to get the virus 
into the vicinity of the enemy leader, a covert operator spreads 
the virus liberally in the area where the covert operator 
frequents. The virus will infect thousands of civilians but will 
only have a lethal effect on the enemy leader. I remind you, 
first of all, that these restrictions only apply to “attacks.” 
Analyzing the law, one might argue that API Article 51.4(c) 
would preclude the attack because it was “of a nature to strike 
military objectives (the enemy leader) and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction.” However, one might equally make 
the argument that the attack did not “strike” civilians; it 
merely used or inconvenienced civilians. The attack ultimately 
discriminated when it finally exercised its lethal payload on the 
 
 155. See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 48.  
 156. See id. art. 51.2.  
 157. See id. art. 51.4.  
 158. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.  
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enemy leader. Is infecting the general populace a violation of 
distinction even though the virus is absolutely discriminating 
in the attack? 
Jeremy Richmond made a similar analysis of the Stuxnet 
computer malware and concluded that had it been used during 
armed conflict, it would have complied with the LOAC despite 
its general dispersion.159 Further clarity in this area of 
emerging technology will provide guidance to states as future 
technologies develop and continue to be used. 
I have already introduced the idea of precautions and the 
potential impact of re-engineering as a factor in the 
commander’s proportionality analysis. API Article 57 requires 
that commanders do “everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects”160 and “take all feasible precautions in the choice of 
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in 
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects.”161   
Does that mean that a commander cannot choose to use a 
weapon that can potentially be re-engineered and used again 
against civilians? Or does it mean that he has to weigh the 
likelihood of it being re-engineered and the likelihood of it 
being used against civilians? Or does it mean that he has to do 
everything feasible to prevent it from being re-engineered 
without having to consider the potential effects if it is? 
 Currently, the law is unclear as to the application of the 
proportionality standard to this analysis. This is another area 
where, as technology advances, the law should advance as well. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Let me now conclude with a quote from David Ignatius. He 
stated:  
The ‘laws of war’ may sound like an antiquated 
concept in this age of robo-weapons. But, in 
truth, a clear international legal regime has 
never been more needed: It is a fact of modern 
life that people in conflict zones live in the 
perpetual cross hairs of deadly weapons. Rules 
 
 159. See Richmond, supra 104, at 894. 
 160. See Protocol I, supra note 65, art. 57.2(a)(i).  
 161. See id. art. 57.2(a)(ii)  
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are needed for targets and targeters alike.162  
I would add that it is not just people living in combat zones, but 
potentially people anywhere in the world are in the cross hairs 
of deadly weapons. 
Now is the time to act. In anticipation of these 
developments, the international community needs to recognize 
the gaps in the current LOAC and seek solutions in advance of 
a future situation. As the LOAC evolves to face anticipated 
future threats, it will help ensure that advancing technologies 
comply with the foundational principles of the LOAC and 
future armed conflicts remain constrained by law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162. David Ignatius, Dazzling New Weapons Require New Rules for War, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2010; see generally Gary Marchant, Douglas Sylvester & 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Nanotechnology Regulation: The United States Approach, 
in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 
189 (Graeme Hodge et al. eds., 2007); Kenneth W. Abbot, Douglas S. Sylvester 
& Gary E. Marchant, Transnational Regulation of Nanotechnology: Reality or 
Romanticism?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON REGULATING 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming); Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Gary E. Marchant, & Douglas J. Sylvester, A Framework Convention for 
Nanotechnology, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10931 (2006); Gary E. Marchant, Douglas 
J. Sylvester & Kenneth W. Abbott, A New Soft Law Approach to 
Nanotechnology Oversight: A Voluntary Product Certification Scheme, 28 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 123 (2010).  
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